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What triggers the execution of actions? What happens in that moment when 
an action is triggered? What mental state is there at the moment of action-
execution that was not there a second before? My aim is to highlight the 
importance of a thus far largely ignored kind of mental state in the discussion 
of these old and much-debated questions: motor imagery. While there have 
been a fair amount of research in psychology and neuroscience on motor 
imagery in the last 30 years or so, it is only recently that we start to 
understand the important role motor imagery plays in action initiation. And 
if, as these findings suggest, motor imagery plays an important role in action 
initiation, we can make progress not only in understanding action initiation in 
general but also in understanding what goes wrong in akratic actions and in 
relapse actions. Finally, this new picture of action-initiation also has far-
reaching consequences for the relation between motivation and causation in 
naturalistic action-explanations.  
 
 
 
I. Introduction: What happens when we act? 
 
What triggers the execution of actions? Suppose that there is a cup of tea next to your 
computer while you’re working. You want to take a sip, you have a belief that the tea is not 
too hot and it would quench your thirst, you have a (distal) intention to take a sip. But you’re 
not doing it. And suddenly, you find yourself taking a sip. What happens in that moment 
when this action is triggered? What mental state is there at the moment of action-execution 
that was not there a second before?  
I take this to be the fundamental question of philosophy of action (see Brand 1978) 
– a question that comes up differently depending on the details of the action theory 
framework one is working with. If we follow Al Mele’s framework, the question is how distal 
intentions give rise to proximal intentions (Mele 1992, 2003). In Searlean language, the 
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question is how we get from prior intentions to intentions-in-actions (Searle 1983), and so 
on.  
The question about what triggers actions also has serious implications for our 
everyday life and wellbeing. In the case of taking a sip of tea, I wanted to do so and I formed 
an intention to do so. The question was just how this desire and intention gave rise to the 
actual bodily movement. But there are other cases where the executed action goes against 
our desires and even our intentions. Akratic actions are obvious examples: next to your 
computer is the TV’s remote control, not a cup of tea. And you want to finish the grant 
proposal and have an all things considered intention to do so, but you nonetheless find 
yourself switching on the TV. How is that action triggered?  
Addictions of various kinds raise the same problem (Brevers et al. 2012). Recovering 
addicts have very strong desire not to relapse. But when they do relapse (when their ‘relapse 
actions’, as I will call them, are triggered), what triggers these actions?  
My aim is to bring a new kind of mental state into the discussion of these old and 
much-debated questions, namely, motor imagery. While there have been a fair amount of 
research in psychology and neuroscience on motor imagery in the last 30 years or so, it is 
only recently that we start to understand the important role motor imagery plays in action 
initiation. And if, as these findings suggest, motor imagery plays an important role in action 
initiation, we can make progress not only in understanding action initiation in general but 
also in understanding what goes wrong in akratic actions and in relapse actions. Finally, this 
new picture of action-initiation also has far-reaching consequences for the relation between 
motivation and causation in naturalistic action-explanations.  
The plan of the paper is the following. I first introduce the concept of motor 
imagery (Section II) and highlight the empirical findings that suggest that motor imagery 
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plays an important role in action initiation (Section III). Then I examine how these findings 
can help us to understand how akratic actions (Section IV) and relapse actions (Section V) 
are triggered and what we can do about this. In the final section, I argue that the importance 
of motor imagery in action initiation indicates a major split between the set of motivating 
mental states and the set of mental states that are causally involved in bringing about an 
action.  
 
II. Motor imagery 
 
I want to introduce the concept of motor imagery with the help of a related concept: mental 
imagery – a concept that has been subject to much more scrutiny in philosophy, psychology 
and neuroscience. Many of the moves made in the mental imagery literature are directly 
applicable to motor imagery.  
Here is an instance of mental imagery: you close your eyes and visualize an apple. It 
is undoubtedly an example of mental imagery, but not a particularly representative one for 
the following reasons.   
First, visualizing an apple is a voluntary act: you count to three and visualize the 
apple. But mental imagery can be involuntary: we have flashbacks of unpleasant scenes and, 
in the auditory sense modality, we have earworms – tunes we keep on ‘hearing’ in the mind’s 
ear, although we really don’t want to.  
Second, and more controversially, visualizing the apple is conscious, but mental 
imagery can also be unconscious. Some (not all) people with aphantasia (the inability to have 
conscious mental imagery) show all the behavioral markers (for example, reaction times) of 
tasks that are generally assumed to involve mental imagery (for example the mental rotation 
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task), while lacking any phenomenology of mental imagery (Zeman et al. 2015, Jacobs et al. 
2017).  
Psychologists and neuroscientists define mental imagery in a way that does not take 
the example of visualizing to be central. Here is a representative definition from a recent 
review article: “We use the term ‘mental imagery’ to refer to representations […] of sensory 
information without a direct external stimulus” (Pearson et al. 2015). This definition does 
not assume that mental imagery is conscious or voluntary. Whenever you have early cortical 
perceptual processing (for example, in the case of visual imagery, in the primary visual cortex 
or the secondary visual cortex or V4/V8) that is not triggered by corresponding sensory 
stimulation, you have mental imagery.  
This way of thinking about mental imagery takes the intuitive conception of imagery 
seriously (as visualizing an apple will come out as an instance of mental imagery), but it 
widens the scope of the concept. If mental imagery is a natural kind, it is not determined by 
our intuitive and introspective conceptions, but rather by the functional category of early 
perceptual processing without sensory input (Nanay 2018, forthcoming).  
What is the lesson from all this for motor imagery? Motor imagery is very different 
from mental imagery (and some of the early discussions of motor imagery focused on 
keeping it apart from mental imagery, see Jeannerod 1994, Currie and Ravenscroft 1997). 
But the more recent literature on mental imagery in psychology and neuroscience should 
help us to have a firmer grip on what motor imagery is.  
Motor imagery has been traditionally understood as the feeling of imagining doing 
something. It is sometimes taken to be necessarily conscious, not just by philosophers 
(Currie and Ravenscroft 1997), sometimes even by psychologists (Jeannerod 1994, 1997, see 
also Brozzo 2017, esp. pp. 243-244 for an overview). And as imagining tends to be a 
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voluntary act, motor imagery is also often taken to be voluntary. So the paradigmatic 
example here is closing your eyes and imagining reaching for an apple.  
But just as in the case of mental imagery, examples of this kind are not representative 
of motor imagery. Motor imagery, just like mental imagery, can be conscious or unconscious 
(see, for example, Osuagwu and Vuckovic 2014) and it can also be voluntary or involuntary. 
In order to understand how we can generalize to involuntary and unconscious cases, we 
should follow Jeannerod’s methodological advice.1 
Jeannerod writes: “Motor imagery would be related to motor physiology in the same 
way visual imagery is related to visual physiology” (Jeannerod 1994, p. 189). And rightly so: if 
visual imagery is ‘early’ cortical activation that is not triggered by corresponding sensory 
stimulation, then motor imagery is ‘late’ cortical activation that does not automatically trigger 
bodily movement.  
More slowly: In the case of visual perception, light hits the retina and this retinal 
stimulation then triggers processing in the primary visual cortex (V1) and then in other early 
cortical visual areas like V2, V4/V8 or MT. When we get processing in these early cortical 
areas without retinal stimulation, we have mental imagery. 
We get the converse picture with motor imagery. When we perform an action, 
before our body moves, there is processing in the primary motor cortex (M1). And before 
that, we get processing in the premotor cortex and in the supplementary motor area (SMA) 
(and before that, in the posterior parietal cortex (PPC)). So processing in PPC, SMA, the 
 
1 Jeannerod was also often taking it for granted that motor imagery is necessarily conscious, 
he even defines motor imagery as “the ability to generate a conscious image of the acting 
self” (Jeannerod 2006, p. 23). But when actually using this concept, he drops the assumption 
that motor imagery is conscious. See esp. Jeannerod 2001, Frak et al. 2001 and the discussion 
between Jeannerod and Rizzolatti following Rizzolatti 1994 about unconscious imagery. 
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premotor cortex and M1 triggers bodily movement. When we have processing in the motor 
cortex without bodily movement, we get motor imagery.  
The paradigmatic example of imagining grasping the apple will come out as motor 
imagery on this definition as we have a large and growing literature on the involvement of 
motor cortex in conscious and voluntary motor imagery (like deliberately imagining doing 
something). Processing in the premotor cortex and the supplementary motor area during 
conscious and voluntary motor imagery has been known for a long time (Roland et al. 1980, 
Fox et al. 1987, Decety et al. 1990, 1994, Stephan et al. 1995, Filimon et al. 2007). The same 
goes for the posterior parietal cortex (Aflalo et al. 2015). 
There have been more controversies about the involvement of the primary motor 
cortex (Roland et al. 1980, Decety et al. 1994, Stephan et al. 1995). But more recently there is 
converging evidence that the primary motor cortex is active during conscious and voluntary 
motor imagery (Gandevia and Rothwell 1987, Roth et al. 1996, Georgopoulos et al. 1989, 
Richter et al. 2000, Porro et al. 1996, Miller et al. 2010, Schnitzler et al. 1997, Saruco 2017, 
see also Dechent et al. 2004 for an error theory of why earlier studies failed to find the 
involvement of M1 in motor imagery).  
It is important that this is a functional, not a physiological way of defining motor 
imagery (just as the definition of mental imagery was also functional and not physiological). 
In the case of mental imagery, processing in V1 that is not triggered by visual input was not 
necessary and sufficient for mental imagery. If the V1 is silent, but there is processing in V2 
or V4 that is not triggered by visual input, we still get mental imagery. What is important is 
that mental imagery is early processing not triggered by corresponding sensory stimulation.  
Similarly, I’m not claiming that activity in M1 that does not trigger bodily movements 
is necessary and sufficient for motor imagery. Even if M1 is silent but the premotor cortex 
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or the SMA is not, and there is no overt movement, we can still talk about motor imagery 
(see, e.g., Gentili et al. 2004, Gandrey et al. 2013, Hanakawa et al. 2008). It is important that 
we do not need to resort to neuroimaging in order to find out whether the subject exercises 
motor imagery - we can also use behavioral methodology. One such behavioral method 
involves eye tracking, as motor imagery evokes very specific eye movement patterns that are 
very different from for example visual mental imagery and that is present both in conscious 
and in unconscious motor imagery (see Poiroux et al. 2015 for a summary of the research on 
this).  
Here is a brief way of summing up how my account of motor imagery is a functional 
account. Just as mental imagery is no input followed by activity in what is the first stop of 
perceptual processing, motor imagery is the last stop of motor processing, not followed by 
any output. 
This way of thinking about motor imagery can also help us with a notorious unclarity 
about the traditional, phenomenological way of zeroing in on motor imagery as the feeling 
of imagining doing something. As it is acknowledged by all involved in this debate, not all 
imaginative episodes of doing something would count as motor imagery: you somehow need 
to imagine doing something from a first person, and not a third person perspective. 
Jeannerod himself made a distinction (following the practice in sport psychology) between 
internal and external imagery, and only the former would count as motor imagery (Jeannerod 
1994, p. 189).   
These distinctions are unclear enough, but they are even more unclear in the light of 
some new findings about the connection between motor and sensory imagery. According to 
these new findings, motor imagery leads to the sensory representation (in fact, in our 
terminology, sensory imagery) of the outcome of the imagined action (Kilteni et al. 2018). 
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Given that neither this sensory representation nor the motor imagery in question need to be 
conscious, keeping motor imagery of doing something and sensory imagery of the 
performance of this action apart will be very difficult if all we can use is phenomenology and 
intuitions. But using the functional definition instead of relying on slippery intuitive and 
introspective markers like ‘first person’ or ‘internal’ would help us to have a more precise 
way of understanding motor imagery.  
 
III. Motor imagery and action-initiation 
 
The question of action initiation is widely studied in neuroscience and psychology. 
Neuroscientists of action make a (not very surprising) distinction between the preparation 
for a movement and the execution of that movement. The set of findings I want to focus on 
here is about one major difference between these two phases of action execution: the 
inhibition of action during the preparation for a movement and the lifting of this inhibition 
shortly before the execution begins (see Porter and Lemon 1993 for an overview). This 
difference is at the segmental spinal level. There is a sharp decrease of spinal reflexes2 during 
preparation for a movement (which prevents motor neurons from spontaneous firing) and 
increase again shortly before execution. (Bonnet and Requin 1982, Requin et al. 1977, 
Fourkas et al. 2006, see also Kyriakatos et al. 2011).  
 
2 More precisely, this decrease in action preparation and increase in action execution is only 
true of T-reflexes, that is, Tendonal reflexes, reflexes induced by a blow on the muscle 
tendon, as in the case of the knee-jerk reflex), not H-reflexes (that is, Hoffmann reflexes, 
reflexes induced by an electric charge). See Porter and Lemon 1993 on a good overview of 
the literature on this. H-reflexes bypass the muscular spindle and does not track the activity 
of the specific muscles involved in the action. It is also influenced by various factors, 
including, among others, caffeine (see Kalmar et al. 2006). T-reflexes, in contrast, track the 
activity of the specific muscles involved in the action via the gamma motor neurons in the 
muscular spindle.  
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 It is important to be clear about what these studies show and what they don’t show. 
They do show that the increase in spinal excitability is necessary for the initiation of action – 
if the spinal excitability is decreased, there is no bodily movement. But what they do not 
show is that the increase in spinal excitability is sufficient for action initiation. It is not, as the 
following set of findings about spinal excitability and motor imagery demonstrate.  
Motor imagery, like action execution, but unlike action preparation, increases spinal 
excitability (Bonnet et al. 1997, Li et al. 2004, Bakker et al. 1996, Guillot et al. 2007, Aoyama 
and Kaneko 2011).3 So whatever increases spinal excitability is there both in motor imagery 
and in action execution. This means that the increase in spinal excitability is not sufficient 
for triggering the action: in the case of motor imagery, we have an increase in spinal 
excitability, but no action performance.  
Given that both motor imagery and action-initiation increase spinal excitability – and 
therefore the ‘readiness’ to perform an action, one should ask how motor imagery might 
contribute to the triggering of the bodily movement.  
The relation between motor imagery and actual action performance has been 
investigated for a long time (see especially Marc Jeannerod’s work: Jeannerod 1994, 1997, 
2006, see also McCormick et al. 2013). It has been known for decades that there is a 
substantial overlap between the brain regions involved in motor imagery and in motor 
representations (see Miller et al. 2010 for a summary). But the main emphasis of the research 
on the connection between motor imagery and action performance has been on how motor 
imagery can help us to make our action performance more accurate (see the vast amount of 
 
3 Further, motor imagery training increases spinal plasticity (Grospretre et al. in press). Note 
that the so-called ‘emulator theory of motor imagery’ (Grush 2004) could be seen as 
anticipating this point. The emulator theory opposes the more mainstream simulator theory  
(of Jeannerod 1994 and Currie and Ravenscroft 1997) and it emphasizes the importance of 
the activation in the motor cortex driving a skeletomuscular ‘emulator’ – this claim could be 
seen as activation in the motor cortex increasing spinal excitability. 
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research in sport psychology on this (Feltz and Landers 1983 is a classic summary)). What I 
want to focus on is a much more recent body of findings, which is not about how motor 
imagery can modify the content of our motor representations, but about how it can help 
trigger action execution.  
And there are some important recent results that suggest that motor imagery can 
make it more likely that the bodily movement is triggered (the findings at the moment seem 
to be limited to some simple bodily movements only, see Rodrigues et al. 2010, Stins et al. 
2015, see also Fourkas et al. 2006). Further, incongruent motor imagery interferes with 
action execution (Ramsey et al. 2010).4  
These findings suggest that the initiation of actions is made more probable by having 
motor imagery of the performance of this action and it is made less probable by having 
motor imagery of some other actions (see also Nanay 2017).  
Nothing in these empirical results suggests that motor imagery reliably lead to action 
execution. All it follows is that it makes the triggering of action execution more likely by 
pushing the spinal excitability further and further up. But the mere fact that motor imagery is 
a factor in what triggers actions is something that could have a significant impact on 
understanding the mechanism of action initiation.5  
 
4 Further, congruent hand posture during motor imagery facilitates spinal excitability, 
whereas incongruent hand posture makes spinal excitability less likely (Vargas et al. 2004). 
5 It is important to distinguish this view of the involvement of motor imagery in action 
initiation from ideomotor theory (see Knuf et al. 2001 for a good summary of the growing 
literature on ideomotor theory). The ideomotor theory is not new. William James famously 
summarized the view as “We think the act, and it is done” (James 1890, vol. ii, p.522). But a 
clearer (and earlier) formulation of the view comes from Johannes Muller: “The idea of a 
particular motion determines a current of nervous action towards the necessary muscles, and 
gives rise to the motion independently of the will” (Müller 1838, p. 944). See also Lotze: “As 
soon as an idea of an accessible goal surfaces into memory, the unfolding action appears as 
directed to that goal, seeking to approach it.” (Lotze 1851, p. 298). More recent incarnations 
of ideomotor theory aim to clarify what this ‘anticipatory image’ (James 1890, vol 2: 501) or 
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IV. Akratic actions 
 
Thinking about the role of motor imagery in action initiation helps us to understand how 
akratic actions are triggered. Few of us have the distal intention to perform akratic actions. 
Nonetheless, these actions are initiated somehow. The question is: how?  
You are working on your computer and suddenly the idea of watching TV instead 
pops into your head. And then you find yourself reaching for the remote. My claim is that 
one of the mental states that has contributed to the triggering of the action of reaching for 
the remote is motor imagery. As a result, one thing we can do if we want to resist the 
temptation of watching TV would be to manipulate your motor imagery (see Papies and 
Barsalou 2015, Cornil and Chandon in press for (modest) steps in this direction).  
The link between motor imagery and akratic actions is even more straightforward in 
cases we might call ‘obsessive procrastination’. You know that you need to work on a grant 
proposal that is due tomorrow, but you are instead playing a video game. You know you 
need to stop, but you keep on playing. If we understand the role of motor imagery in action 
initiation, this is not surprising at all. When playing a video game, you already have your 
motor imagery engaged in the video game and this leads to the initiation of the action of 
playing another level, rather than getting up and going to your computer to work on the 
grant proposal.  
 
‘response image’ (Greenwald 1970) that initiates action amounts to. This ‘image’ is a 
representation of the effect of the action (thus the label ‘ideomotor’). Whether this 
representation should be understood as a sensory representation is not clear (see Knuf et al. 
2001 for discussion), but what is certain is that it is not the kind of representation that would 
involve cortical motor processing, let alone processing in M1. Whatever triggers action 
according to the ideomotor theory is not motor imagery. 
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 I should emphasize that these are supposed to be partial explanations. There are 
many mental states that are involved in performing akratic actions and I do not want to 
pretend that I can explain all of them. My aim was to highlight an important mental 
antecedent of akratic action that we may have more control over than other, less clearly 
understood motives of akratic actions.  
On a pragmatic note, it seems to follow from this that if you feel the temptation to 
reach for that remote control, not imagining doing so (or imagining performing other 
actions) may help you to resist this temptation, whereas imagining doing so will increase the 
probability that you succumb to the temptation.  
And here we can plug in one of the most celebrated results of sport psychology 
about motor imagery. It has been found that the precision and even the strength of complex 
motor actions is increased merely by the subject looking at the object these actions are 
performed with or on. The explanation of this is that the mere perception of this object 
triggers motor imagery and this repeatedly triggered motor imagery contributes to the better 
(more accurate, more forceful) performance of this action (Feltz and Landers 1983, Bakker 
et al. 1996).  
What is relevant from these findings for our purposes is that merely perceiving an 
object with which we are used to performing an action triggers motor imagery of this action. 
So seeing a remote control will trigger motor imagery of grasping it and pushing the on 
button. And merely seeing a glass of wine will induce motor imagery of lifting it up and 
taking a sip.  
So one, simple and not always available, way of reducing the chance of performing 
an action we do not want to perform is to make the objects that are required for performing 
this action perceptually unavailable (that is, to hide that remote or not to have Facebook 
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open in your browser, for example). Or, if this is not an option, the same can be achieved by 
making these objects inaccessible by a well-trained motor routine. If we don’t perceive this 
object, the motor imagery is less likely to be activated. And if we do perceive it, but the 
motor routine is not well-trained, the motor imagery is, again, less likely to be activated.  
This proposal could also be taken to be continuous with some influential 
philosophical accounts of resisting temptations (that is, resisting the initiation of the 
tempting action). Richard Holton argues that it can be detrimental of our determination to 
resist temptation to think about the tempting action (Holton 2009, pp 126ff.). The present 
proposal could be thought of as extending this general approach. Rather than focusing on 
thinking about one’s options in general, the aim here is to identify just what kind of mental 
processes would be needed to push us over the threshold of action-initiation. And my 
answer is that this mental process is motor imagery.  
 
V. Relapse actions  
 
One advantage of this view of the role of motor imagery in action initiation is that it can 
help us to explain some empirical findings about addiction treatment. The study I want to 
focus on is about alcoholics who were trained to use a joystick when presented with pictures 
of alcohol and of non-alcoholic beverages (Wiers et al. 2011, see also Palfai 2006, Wiers et al. 
2010).  
Subjects in this experiment had to move the joystick away from themselves when 
presented with pictures of alcohol and they had to move the joystick towards themselves 
when they saw a picture of non-alcoholic beverages. The control group was either not 
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trained in any ways, or were trained to respond to some other, not alcohol-related feature of 
the picture.  
The result was that those who were trained to make avoidance movements in 
response to pictures of alcohol showed significantly more progress at recovery in a year’s 
time (Wiers et al. 2011). In some cases, even a single training session had a significant 
positive effect (see esp. Wiers et al. 2010).  
It is not clear how we can explain this effect – it was not clear to the experimenters 
who conducted these studies either. Wiers et al. 2011 hypothesizes, very tentatively, that 
maybe emotions are involved (roughly, retraining the action-tendencies lead to emotional 
change). But it is not clear how this connection would work and how such change in 
emotions would lead to such drastic improvement in recovery.  
If we accept that motor imagery plays an important role in action initiation, we get a 
much more straightforward explanation. As we have seen, incongruent motor imagery 
interferes with action execution (Ramsey et al. 2010). And the joystick exercise these subjects 
perform train them to have motor imagery in response to pictures of alcohol that is 
incongruent with approach behavior. As a result, their action execution (of reaching for 
alcohol in relapse situations) is less likely to be triggered.  
This is a very promising way of treating addictions. One important marker of 
addiction is that addicts’ attention is captured by addiction-relevant stimuli (see Brevers et al. 
2011 for a summary of the vast literature on this, see also Anderson and Yantis 2013 for 
how this fits into long term value-driven attentional effects). And ‘addiction-relevant stimuli’ 
here does not merely mean stimuli that is directly connected to the addiction (in the case of 
gambling addiction: the roulette table), but a much wider range of stimuli that would be 
somehow very distantly related to the addictive behavior (for example, the shirt you once 
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wore in the casino, and so on). It is not an option to hide all possible addiction-relevant 
stimuli (because they are everywhere).  
So addicts perceptually encounter addiction-relevant stimuli all the time and their 
attention is captured by these stimuli. And the intense capture of the addict’s attention 
makes the triggering of motor imagery also more intense. So the only available option seems 
to be to reprogram the motor imagery itself, which, as we have seen, is not an impossible 
task.  
 
VI. Motivation vs. causation 
 
One salient feature of the relation between motor imagery and action initiation I argued for 
above is that the set of mental states that cause action are not the same as the set of mental 
states that motivate the action.  
 This constitutes a major departure from the standard causal theories of action, where 
the mental states that cause us to act are also the ones that motivate us to act.6 This is true of 
the original Davidsonian picture (where these motivating and also causing mental states 
would be beliefs and desires, see Davidson 1980), but also on the later intention-centered 
and dual intention accounts (where they would be (proximal) intentions, see Mele 1992,7 
Bratman 1987, Searle 1983). 
 
6 This move needs to be distinguished from one in the vicinity that got more attention in the 
contemporary philosophy of action literature, namely, the distinction between what one 
intends to do and what one is motivated to do (see Mele 1992, Holton 2009). My distinction 
is between what intention we have (which may or may not also be the motivation we have) 
to act and what causes us to act, that is, what actually triggers our action.  
7 Again, see the previous footnote on how Mele’s way of resisting the equation of motivation 
and causation is different from mine.  
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A consequence of the general picture of action initiation I argued for is that these 
two sets of mental states can come apart: motor imagery clearly plays an important causal 
role in triggering action initiation, but it is not a motivating state by any account of 
motivation.8  
Motor imagery is not a reason for action (a concept often brought in when talking 
about motivation). And it is not (normally) available to conscious introspection (which 
seems to be an important feature of motivating mental state types). Motor imagery is not a 
motivational mental state, but it is causally involved in triggering action initiation. It shows 
that causation and motivation of action needs to be kept apart.  
 Does this move of severing the ties between motivation and causation of action need 
to worry the proponents of a causal theory of action? I don’t think so. The entire process of 
action initiation I described is a causal process. Depending on what version of the causal 
theory of action one accepts, this would lead to different pictures. If, for example, we go 
with Al Mele’s (Mele 1992) account, the links between distal intention, motor imagery and 
proximal intention and the bodily movements are all causal links. The only difference is that 
my account adds an extra causal ingredient to the standard causal picture, that of motor 
imagery.  
 A last worry about this way of tweaking the causal theory would be the following. 
One alleged advantage of the original causal theories of action is that all the causally 
efficacious mental states are mental states we have access to: mental states that we are aware 
of. This is, again, true of Davidson’s original account, where we are very much aware of our 
 
8 While motor imagery is not a motivating state, it can and does interact with motivation in 
the sense that motor imagery can make it more likely that we have a desire or intention to do 
something. The role of mental (that is, sensory) imagery in desires has been widely discussed 
in psychology by the ‘elaborated thought theory of desire’, for example. But the imagery that 
influences (or elaborates) our desires could also be thought to be motor imagery. See Nanay 
forthcoming. Thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me clarify this point.  
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beliefs and desires that cause and motivate us to act. And it is also true of the dual intention 
theories where we are aware of our proximal (and if they are present, also our distal) 
intentions.  
 But the worry would be that this is not so when it comes to motor imagery. So one 
could argue that motor imagery is something that we merely postulate theoretically in order 
to explain some odd phenomena – it could be thought to be a theoretical entity, opening the 
door for various versions of antirealism about theoretical entities.  
 My response is threefold. First, we often are aware of motor imagery. As we have 
seen, motor imagery may or may not be conscious. If it is conscious, it can be subject to 
introspection. This response addresses a potential pushback from a causal theorist, namely, 
that they should take into consideration a merely subpersonal state that causally contributes 
to action execution (after all, there are many of these, along the motor nerve). The answer is 
that motor imagery is not a merely subpersonal state. Even if we accept the 
personal/subpersonal distinction as unproblematic (I myself don’t think we should), a state 
that can become conscious, if attention is allocated to it, is not a subpersonal state. In other 
words, motor imagery, although it can be unconscious, is a bona fide mental state (an 
analogy: perceptual states can also be, and are often, unconscious, nonetheless, it would be 
odd to deny that perceptual states are bona fide mental states).  
Second, I don’t see any problem with postulating mental states if the only way in 
which we can explain the agent’s complex behavior is by postulating these mental states. We 
have extremely rich and varied evidence that our introspective access to our own mind is 
limited and often systematically misleading. But then we should not expect that we are aware 
of all the crucial building blocks of the mind and of all the causal ingredients of action 
performance.  
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 Finally, the fact that some causally relevant components of action initiation are 
unconscious is not a bug, but a feature (Nanay 2014). There are many actions where we are 
not aware of whatever moves us to act. Impulsive actions would constitute one kind of 
example. We just find ourselves acting – we have a sense of ownership of our action, but we 
do not have a sense of having initiated it. Akratic actions, as we have seen, would be another.  
But there are even more prosaic cases. You’re lying in bed in the morning, having hit 
the snooze button three times already and you know you need to get up, but somehow you 
just don’t. And then all of a sudden, you find yourself getting up. You are not aware of the 
state that moved you to act. Here is a literary example by Robert Musil:  
 
I have never caught myself in the act of willing. It was always the case that I 
saw only the thought – for example when I’m lying on one side in bed: now 
you ought to turn yourself over. This thought goes marching on in a state of 
complete equality with a whole set of other ones: for example, your foot is 
starting to feel stiff, the pillow is getting hot, etc. It is still a proper act of 
reflection; but it is still far from breaking out into a deed. On the contrary, I 
confirm with a certain consternation that, despite these thoughts, I still 
haven’t turned over. As I admonish myself that I ought to do so and see that 
this does not happen, something akin to depression takes possession of me, 
albeit a depression that is at once scornful and resigned. And then, all of a 
sudden, and always in an unguarded moment, I turn over. As I do so, the 
first thing that I am conscious of is the movement as it is actually being 
performed, and frequently a memory that this started out from some part of 
the body or other, from the feet, for example, that moved a little, or were 
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unconsciously shifted, from where they had been lying, and that they then 
drew all the rest after them.9  
 
Many of our actions are like this. And we should not dismiss these cases as rare instances of 
unimportant actions. Some of our actions of great importance are also like this: going in for 
that first kiss (assuming you don’t do it by counting to three), for example.  
Any philosophical account of action needs to take actions of this kind seriously. But 
if so, then we need to postulate a mental state that we do not have to be aware of. So we 
could turn the table and argue that those accounts of action are problematic that do not 
posit causally efficacious mental states that we are not aware of.  
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
An old and influential (Kantian) idea about mental imagery (or imagination) is that it is “a 
necessary ingredient of perception itself” (Strawson 1974, p. 54 – the metaphor and the 
quote are originally from Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, A120, fn. a, see also Sellars 1978, 
Thomas 2009), but it has become a widespread slogan. Eugène Delacroix, for example, 
wrote: “Even when we look at nature, our imagination constructs the picture”.10 There are 
many ways of substantiating this claim, some more plausible than others. One relatively 
strong version is that of this claim is that perception depends constitutively on the exercise 
of mental imagery. A weaker claim would be that this dependence relation is a merely causal 
one. What these different accounts of the dependence between mental imagery and 
 
9 Robert Musil: Diaries. New York: Basic Books, 1999, p. 101. See also James 1890, Goldie 
2004, pp. 97-98. 
10 Delacroix: Journal, 1859, September 1.  
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perception agree on is that understanding mental imagery is a crucial part of understanding 
perception per se (Nanay 2010, 2015, 2018).  
 To pursue the structural analogy between sensory imagery and motor imagery, one 
way of summarizing the philosophical upshot of the proposal outlined in this paper is that 
just as understanding sensory imagery is a crucial part of understanding perception per se, 
understanding motor imagery is an equally crucial part of understanding action per se. Just as 
perception would be very different if mental imagery played no role in it (in amodal 
completion as well as multimodal perception), action would also be very different if motor 
imagery played no role in it. Philosophy of action should take the concept of motor imagery 
seriously.11  
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